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In this paper, we present evidence that ﬁrms with concentrated ownership
manage earnings when their large shareholders have an incentive to do so.
The large shareholders of Chinese public ﬁrms often pledge their shares for
loans. Before the split share reform in 2006, loan terms were based on the book
value of the ﬁrm. Since then, the share price has become critical for share
pledged loans. We postulate that the reform triggered large shareholders’
incentive to inﬂuence ﬁnancial reports. Using a sample of non-state-owned
enterprises, we test the eﬀect of share pledges on earnings smoothing and
how this eﬀect changes after the reform. Our results suggest that share pledging
ﬁrms smooth their earnings more than other ﬁrms, but these results are only
found after the split share reform. Accordingly, our results provide more direct
evidence on the eﬀect of ownership concentration on ﬁnancial reporting.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Concentrated ownership creates opportunities for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from
other shareholders. Most research shows that concentrated ownership is associated with lower earnings qual-
ity (Fan and Wong, 2002; Francis et al., 2005a,b). However, Wang (2006) argues that controlling shareholders
may provide higher quality reporting because they are long-term investors and care about the reputation,
wealth and long-term performance of their ﬁrms. These two diﬀerent eﬀects associated with controlling
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2006). Given the competing views and evidence in the literature, we conclude that the eﬀect of ownership struc-
ture on ﬁnancial reporting behavior is complicated and needs further investigation.
A unique Chinese setting provides an opportunity for us to re-examine this issue. Generally, Chinese public
ﬁrms have one dominant shareholder whose ownership is much higher than the next largest shareholder. The
large shareholders also tend to hold important positions in the management team. In recent years, large share-
holders have often used their shares as collateral to obtain short-term loans. Prior to the split share reform in
2006, the pledged shares were mostly non-tradable. Although large shareholders retained their status after the
split share reform, their incentives to inﬂuence ﬁnancial reporting have changed. This setting allows us to com-
pare the eﬀects of controlling shareholders’ incentives on their ﬁrms’ discretionary ﬁnancial reporting
decisions.
The ﬁndings of numerous studies indicate that managers tend to manage earnings around major ﬁnancing
events, such as IPOs, seasoned equity oﬀerings and seasoned bond oﬀerings (see Leuz et al., 2003; Park and
Shin, 2004; Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010; Caton et al., 2011). Consistent with the literature, we predict that
for share pledge purposes, controlling shareholders tend to manage their ﬁrms’ accounting performance to
increase the value of their collateral.
Before the loans are made, controlling shareholders have incentives to manage earnings to increase their
borrowing capacity (e.g., higher loan amounts, lower interest rates, and lower contracting costs) (Ahn and
Choi, 2009). As required by law, pledge loan contracts should include a maintenance requirement. After a
share pledged loan is made, if the share price drops, the value of the collateral will also decrease, and share-
holders (borrowers) will have to make up for the decrease. This scenario is similar to a margin call when buy-
ing on margin. To avoid such costly consequences, shareholders will do whatever they can to uphold the share
price. Chan et al. (2013) ﬁnd that pledging ﬁrms make repurchases when prices drop. Because ﬁnancial report-
ing inﬂuences the share price, we expect that shareholders will also manage their earnings to avoid dramatic
price drops. Dye (1988) suggests that managers may smooth earnings to increase their ﬁrms’ share price. Given
that most shareholders pledge repeatedly, we predict that share pledged loans increase the degree of earnings
smoothing.
However, if the share price is not the primary factor in deciding the loan terms, the shareholder will have no
incentive to smooth earnings. In China, listed companies had dual class share ownership until the split share
reform in 2006. The shares pledged by large shareholders, which were non-tradable, were evaluated by the
book value of the ﬁrm. At this time, shareholders were indiﬀerent to the share price. However, the split share
reform in 2006 eliminated the discrepancies in the share transfer system. Since then, the value of pledged
shares is based on their market price. Therefore, we predict that earnings smoothing is more likely in share
pledging ﬁrms than other ﬁrms after the split share reform.
In our setting, we posit the same analytical relationship as Tucker and Zarowin (2006), who measure earn-
ings smoothing by the negative correlation between the change in the discretionary-accruals proxy and the
change in pre-discretionary income. Our hypothesis concerns the comparative smoothing of the share pledging
ﬁrms and other ﬁrms. Using non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on the Chinese capital market as our
sample, we test the moderation eﬀect of share pledges on the above correlation. Consistent with our hypoth-
esis, we ﬁnd that share pledging ﬁrms smooth earnings more than other ﬁrms. This phenomenon is only
observed after the split share reform.
Since the split share reform, shareholders have had the option of selling their shares or making a pledged
loan. This raises the question of why some shareholders do not sell their shares. First, shareholders may not
want to take the risk of losing their control rights. Because it is diﬃcult to obtain approval for an IPO in
China, listed companies are themselves valuable resources for capital raising (Liu and Lu, 2007). Second,
shareholders may consider the share price to be undervalued, either because they have private information
or they are irrationally optimistic about company prospects (Chan et al., 2013). Although we cannot deter-
mine the exact reason for each pledge announcement, we ﬁnd that shareholdings are positively correlated with
earnings smoothing. The more shares held by large shareholders, the less they fear losing their control rights,
and the more likely the shares are undervalued in the case of a pledge. Therefore, the earnings smoothing that
we ﬁnd in pledged ﬁrms is also consistent with the argument of Ronen and Sadan (1981) that the ﬁrms are
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market returns than the matched sample.
We examine how the change of incentives inﬂuences ﬁnancial reporting decisions in ﬁrms with concentrated
ownership. Our major conclusion is that ownership concentration only aﬀects ﬁnancial reporting if large
shareholders have such a motivation. Our ﬁndings contribute to three strands of the literature. First, our
research diﬀers from the literature on ownership concentration and earnings management in that we use a
special setting in which large shareholders’ incentives are distinct, whereas previous research only postulates
diﬀerent incentives. Moreover, our tests focus on the eﬀect of incentives on income smoothing, whereas
previous research mostly tests the association between ownership concentration and earnings quality. Second,
we also further our understanding of the eﬀects of the split share reform. Most of the related research ﬁnd that
the split share reform has a positive eﬀect (Hou and Lee, 2014; Li and Zhang, 2011). We show that the split
share reform may activate the incentives for earnings management. Finally, we contribute to the growing body
of research on the economic consequences of share pledges (Chan et al., 2013; Kao and Wei, 2014; Kao and
Chen, 2007; Kao et al., 2004; Yeh et al., 2009). For example, Kao and Chen (2007) and Kao and Wei (2014)
ﬁnd that directors’ share collateralization reduces the quality of ﬁnancial information. However, Tan and Wu
(2013) argue that pledged ﬁrms’ earnings quality is better due to the quality control of ﬁnancial institutions. We
provide more insights into this issue by testing for earnings smoothing before and after the split share reform.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy introduce the Chinese capital
market, share pledges, and the split share reform. In Section 3, we review the literature and discuss our
hypothesis. In Section 4, we explain our research design. Our empirical results are reported in Section 5.
The last section concludes the paper.
2. Institutional background
2.1. Chinese capital market and share pledges
In the Chinese capital market, which was founded in the early 1990s, the majority of listed ﬁrms are
restructured from SOEs. In recent years, the number of non-SOE ﬁrms has increased notably as a result
of the reform of the IPO regulations and the privatization of state-controlled listed ﬁrms (Xia, 2008). For
both SOEs and non-SOEs, the listed companies are normally the strongest part of the company group.
All of the other subsidiaries of the group have limited ﬁnancing sources. The formal and informal procedures
of the banking system associated with lending to SOEs rely on collateral and personal relationships. Conse-
quently, the large shareholders of many of the ﬁrms that have their shares traded on the security market
pledge their shares for loans, especially for non-SOEs, whose large shareholders cannot easily obtain bank
loans.
According to the listing rules of the Chinese stock exchanges ﬁrms should make announcements when their
large shareholders (with more than 5% of shareholdings) pledge their shareholdings for loans. Since 2006,
pledging has been active in some of the capital-intensive industries. For example, 348 listed companies
reported share pledges in 2010, and the number increased to 697 in 2012. The annual growth rate is about
45%. The value of shares pledged by the shareholders of listed companies in 2012 reached RMB620 billion.
Accordingly, it appears to have become common practice that large shareholders of listed ﬁrms pledge their
shares as collateral for loans.
A pledge is a method of transferring collateral to create a security interest in the collateral. The collateral
provider, the borrower, retains legal ownership of the assets. The lender has the right to keep the assets in the
event of default by the collateral provider. Although pledges enable shareholders to obtain low cost loans
without losing control of their ﬁrms, there are a number of risks associated with the pledging of shares. In
the case of a default, the ﬁnancial institution can sell the shares on the open market to recover the dues, which
can result in a fall in the share price and erosion of market capitalization. Shareholders also run the risk of
losing management control if a large proportion of their holding is pledged. According to the Administrative
Measures for the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies, promulgated by The People’s Bank of
China and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2000, a share pledge agreement should
include a maintenance requirement. If the share price drops below the maintenance requirement, the share-
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may result in a change of corporate behavior.
2.2. Ownership concentration and split share reform
Ownership of listed companies in China is typically concentrated in the hands of large shareholders. For
example, Chen et al. (2009) report that on average, across all listed ﬁrms, the largest shareholder owns
43.75% of a ﬁrm, while the second largest owns 8.16%. When the Chinese capital market was founded, a
unique feature of the ownership structure of listed companies was the split share structure. Under the split
share structure, the shares of Chinese listed ﬁrms were classiﬁed into non-tradable and freely tradable shares.
Non-tradable shares exhibited the same voting and cash ﬂow rights as tradable shares, but they could not be
traded freely on the stock exchange. Non-tradable shares were held by the founders of the company. Conse-
quently, large shareholders normally held large amounts of non-tradable shares. Although the non-tradable
shares were designed to help the government control the SOEs, the same structure existed for non-SOEs. This
structure distorted the pricing mechanism in the capital market and caused many corporate governance prob-
lems (Li and Zhang, 2011). Large shareholders did not care about share prices, and tunneling by large share-
holders was a serious problem for Chinese listed ﬁrms.
In 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) started the split share reform, which
required non-tradable shareholders to pay tradable shareholders to gain the right to trade. By the end of
2006, 95% of China’s publicly listed companies were involved in the split share structure reform. The reform
measures were fully completed in 2007 (Li and Zhang, 2011). However, there were no fundamental changes in
ownership structure after the reform.
Since non-tradable shares became tradable, the use of share pledges has continually increased. Using the
market share price as a reference, share pledge loan terms can include a margin call requirement. The split
share reform is the cornerstone of the development of the Chinese capital market.
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
3.1. Ownership structure and discretionary earnings reporting
The research on ownership structure and discretionary ﬁnancial reporting has yielded mixed results. The
entrenchment view suggests that concentrated ownership decreases earnings quality. As discussed by
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), controlling shareholders have incentives to maximize their own beneﬁts at the cost
of minority shareholders. Claessens et al. (2002) argue that large shareholdings have an entrenchment eﬀect,
which decreases ﬁrm value. Fan and Wong (2002) ﬁnd that earnings are more informative for ﬁrms with less
concentrated ownership in East Asian countries. Their evidence indicates that greater ownership concentra-
tion creates greater agency conﬂicts and information asymmetry. Francis et al. (2005a,b) provide similar
evidence in the U.S. environment, and ﬁnd lower earnings response coeﬃcients for ﬁrms with ownership
structures that have unequal voting rights. In the Chinese setting, Liu and Sun (2010) document evidence that
controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders and lower the quality of ﬁnancial reports.
The alignment view suggests that concentrated ownership increases earnings quality. A long line of research
suggests that managers engage in earnings management because of capital market pressures or to avoid
violation of contracts (see the review of Dechow and Skinner (2000)). Controlling shareholders are able to
discipline managers in the case of opportunistic actions (Fan and Wong, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997),
such as manipulating reported performance for compensation contracts. By aligning the interests of managers
with shareholders, managers have less incentive and/or ability to manipulate short-term performance as the
controlling shareholders care mostly about the long-term performance of the ﬁrm. Warﬁeld et al. (1995) ﬁnd
that low managerial ownership creates a demand for contracts that rely on accounting information to
constrain managers’ opportunistic behavior. They ﬁnd that greater managerial ownership is associated with
higher earnings quality. Wang (2006) documents that founding families are less likely to expropriate wealth
from other shareholders through managing earnings. He explains that founding families have a long-term
orientation and seek to protect their reputation by not opportunistically managing earnings.
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and manipulate earnings to cover their behavior. However, whether they have always had the incentive to do
so remains an open question. As discussed by Ball et al. (2003), the incentives of ﬁnancial statement preparers
play an essential role in reporting high-quality ﬁnancial information. The disparity between the two theories is
mostly related to incentives. Few studies have provided causal evidence that a concentrated ownership struc-
ture leads to discretionary earnings reporting because it is diﬃcult to directly depict the incentives.
We extend the existing research by examining a speciﬁc setting in which controlling shareholders develop an
incentive to inﬂuence ﬁnancial reports. Speciﬁcally, as detailed in the following part, we examine whether
share pledging ﬁrms are more likely to smooth earnings before and after the split share reform.3.2. Share pledges and earnings smoothing
Collateral is an important part of most of the loans made in China. When the collateral comprises tangible
assets, ﬁnancial institutions can control it, and the value does not change too much. However, when the col-
lateral is shares, the controlling rights of the ﬁrm still belong to the borrower (large shareholder). The large
shareholder can inﬂuence the value of the collateral by making all kinds of decisions for the ﬁrm.
As with other ﬁnancing events, shareholders seek to improve their bargaining power in negotiating loan
covenants with ﬁnancial institutions. This may induce shareholders to increase the value of their pledges,
namely the shareholdings. With other ﬁnancing events, management tends to increase share value by manag-
ing pre-ﬁnancing earnings. For example, numerous studies have investigated earnings management behavior
around signiﬁcant ﬁnancing events, such as IPOs (e.g. Aharony et al., 2010; Teoh et al., 1998a), seasoned
equity oﬀerings (Teoh et al., 1998b), and initial bond oﬀerings (Caton et al., 2011). Unlike the widely spread
ownership in the U.S. and U.K., Chinese listed ﬁrms are dominated by large shareholders, who are either gov-
ernment related or individuals. The large shareholders usually have eﬀective control over the ﬁrm (Chen et al.,
2008), and thus have both the incentive and ability to inﬂate earnings before share pledges.
After a share pledge, large shareholders may also have an incentive to manipulate the value of the pledged
shares. If the share price drops below the maintenance requirement, the shareholders need to meet the margin
call. This margin call pressure is similar to the pressure from a debt covenant. Numerous studies have pro-
vided evidence that debt is positively associated with income-increasing earnings management when ﬁrms
want to reduce the probability of debt covenant violations (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and
Skinner, 2002; Jaggi and Lee, 2002). A share pledged loan is diﬀerent because the debt covenant may not
directly be based on the accounting numbers of the pledged ﬁrm. Moreover, if the share price drops, share-
holders have other options to uphold the share price. For example, Chan et al. (2013) ﬁnd that high pledge
companies are more likely to repurchase, especially after a signiﬁcant drop in share prices. However, because
earnings announcements inﬂuence share prices, shareholders may also manage their earnings to avoid sharp
price drops. If shareholders inﬂate earnings before a share pledge, the price will be more likely to drop after-
ward, which will increase the pressure of the margin call. Taken together, for share pledge purposes, large
shareholders need to increase the share price, but they will not manipulate earnings in a way which would
be hard to continue. Instead, they prefer increasing the share price steadily or at least ensuring a stable share
price.
Using data from Taiwan, Kao and Chen (2007) ﬁnd that the more shares collateralized by the board of
directors, the greater the extent of earnings management. Kao et al. (2004) ﬁnd that collateralized shares have
a negative relationship with ﬁrms’ accounting performance, which could be seen as the reverse eﬀect after
earnings management in the year of the pledge. However, Chinese large shareholders may not conduct earn-
ings management in a once and for all manner. Financial institutions usually only provide short-term loans
with shares as collateral. If large shareholders need long-term ﬁnance, they have to pledge repeatedly, which
is normally the case. If they inﬂate earnings once, the subsequent reversal in earnings will harm their future
bargaining power. Thus, they are likely to smooth earnings to facilitate share pledged loans.
Research indicates that ﬁrms smooth earnings to meet certain goals (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). For exam-
ple, managers may smooth earnings to meet a bonus target or to protect their job (Arya et al., 1998; Healy,
1985). In our case, the intention of large shareholders is to increase the share price for share pledged loans.
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risk, thereby increasing the share price (Beidleman, 1973; Trueman and Titman, 1988).
Other research suggests that only ﬁrms with good future prospects can aﬀord to smooth earnings (e.g.
Ronen and Sadan, 1981). Managers use their discretion to communicate their assessment of future earnings.
As abovementioned, a possible reason why shareholders choose to pledge their shares rather than sell them is
that they believe their shares are undervalued. The shareholders of such ﬁrms may be more conﬁdent about
their future and believe they have the ability to smooth. Hence, share pledged ﬁrms may have both the moti-
vation and ability to smooth earnings.
Although shareholders may intend to smooth earnings, the ﬁnancial checking by banks possibly limits this
opportunistic practice (Tan and Wu, 2013). However, other research indicates that Chinese banks do not pro-
vide the same governance role as Western banks (Hu et al., 2011). In addition, banks make their loan decisions
based on the current market value of the collateral. If the market value drops, they can ask for supplementary
pledges based on the contract and law. Secured by such terms, banks have less incentive to check the funda-
mental value of the collateral. Their incentive would be even less after a share pledge.
3.3. Eﬀect of the split share reform
The premise of the above arguments is that share pledged loans are based on the share price. However,
before the split share reform, large shareholders often pledged their non-tradable shareholdings. The
non-tradable shares could not be publicly traded on the open market, and thus there was no market price.
However, the shares could still be transferred by auction or transfer agreement, mostly based on book value
(Chen et al., 2008). Financial institutions accepted non-tradable shares as collateral for loans. Because
non-tradable shares were less liquid, the banks had to bear higher risk. This is probably why there were much
fewer share pledge announcements before the split share reform.
Moreover, Sun (2010) investigates the share pledges between 2001 and 2004, and ﬁnds evidence that the
value of the collateral is based mostly on the book value per share of the listed ﬁrm. The proﬁtability or size
of the listed ﬁrm has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the value of pledged non-tradable shares. Therefore, neither
the earnings nor the market price of tradable shares are particularly relevant for shareholders or ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in making their share pledged loan agreements.
The preceding discussion suggests that share pledging ﬁrms have diﬀerent discretionary ﬁnancial reporting
incentives than other ﬁrms, but only after the split share reform. We formulate our hypothesis as follows:
H1. Share pledging ﬁrms smooth earnings more than other ﬁrms.
H1a. Share pledging ﬁrms smooth earnings NO more than the other ﬁrms before the split share reform.
H1b. Share pledging ﬁrms smooth earnings more than other ﬁrms after the split share reform.4. Empirical design
4.1. Model of earnings smoothing and share pledges
Our main tests focus on the association between share pledges and earnings smoothing. There are several
models for estimating earnings smoothing in the literature (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Dou et al., 2013; Tucker
and Zarowin, 2006). As some of the share pledging ﬁrms in our sample pledge in one year and not in other
years, we are unlikely to be able to calculate the variance, which means that we cannot use the models of
Burgstahler et al. (2006) or Dou et al. (2013). Therefore, we follow the speciﬁcation of Tucker and
Zarowin (2006) in testing our earnings smoothing hypothesis. We measure earnings smoothing by the negative
correlation between the change in discretionary-accruals proxy (‘‘DDA”) and the change in pre-discretionary
income (‘‘DPDI”). The pre-discretionary income (PDI) is calculated as net income (scaled by lagged assets)
minus discretionary accruals (PDI = E-DA). Thus, DE ¼ DDAþ DPDI. This measure assumes that there is
an underlying pre-managed income series and that managers use discretionary accruals to make the reported
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The regression model is shown as Eq. (1):DDAit ¼ d0 þ d1DPDIit þ d2Pledge YNi;t  DPDIit þ ni;t: ð1Þ
We postulate that if the ﬁrms have their shares pledged, shareholders will have more incentive to smooth
earnings. Thus, we use a dummy variable (Pledge_YN) to measure share pledges. Pledge_YN equals 1 if the
company’s shares have been pledged, and 0 otherwise. We expect that both d1 and d2 will be signiﬁcantly
negative.
To help illustrate our model, consider the following reasoning:
Because DEt ¼ DDAt þ DPDIt by replacing DDAt with Eq. (1) we have model (1-1):
DEt ¼ DDAt þ DPDIt ¼ d0 þ ð1þ d1ÞDPDIt þ d2Pledge YNt  DPDIt þ nt; ð1-1Þwhen Pledge YNt ¼ 0, model (1-1) can be rewritten as
DEt ¼ DDAt þ DPDIt ¼ d0 þ ð1þ d1ÞDPDIt þ nt:If we calculate the variance on both sides, we haveVarðDEtÞ ¼ ð1þ d1Þ2VarðDPDItÞ þ r2:
If r2  VarðDPDItÞ, then we have model (1-2):Income-smoothing coefficient 1ðISC1Þ ¼ VarðDEtÞ=VarðDPDItÞ  ð1þ d1Þ2: ð1-2Þ
If d1 < 0, then VarðDEtÞ=VarðDPDItÞ < 1, which means that the volatility of actual earnings is lower than
that of pre-managed earnings. Therefore, the company will probably smooth its earnings.
 when Pledge YNt ¼ 1, model (1-1) can be rewritten asDEt ¼ DDAt þ DPDIt ¼ d0 þ ð1þ d1 þ d2ÞDPDIt þ nt:
If we calculate the variance on both sides, we haveVarðDEtÞ ¼ ð1þ d1 þ d2Þ2VarðDPDItÞ þ r2:
If r2  VarðDPDItÞ, then we have model (1-3):Income-smoothing coefficient 2ðISC2Þ ¼ VarðDEtÞ=VarðDPDItÞ  ð1þ d1 þ d2Þ2: ð1-3Þ
If d2 < 0, this indicates that the earnings smoothing coeﬃcient for pledged ﬁrms (ISC2) is smaller than that
of other ﬁrms (ISC1). Therefore, pledged ﬁrms smooth earnings more than other ﬁrms. As a conclusion,
model 1 can be used to test whether pledged ﬁrms smooth earnings.
To test our hypothesis on the eﬀect of the split-share reform, we partition our sample into two periods:
2004–2006 and 2007–2011.
4.2. Estimation of discretionary accruals
To estimate discretionary accruals (DA) in model 1, we use the cross-sectional version of the Jones model,
modiﬁed by Kothari et al. (2005):TAi;t ¼ d0 þ d1ð1=Ait1Þ þ d2DREVit þ d3PPEit þ d4ROAit þ lit; ð2Þ
where TAi;t represents the total accruals of ﬁrm i at time t;DREVit is the change in sales scaled by lagged total
assets, Ait1, and PPEit is net tangible long-term assets scaled by Ait1: ROAit is the return on total assets in the
current year, which is included because research shows that the Jones model is misspeciﬁed for well-
performing or poorly performing ﬁrms.
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cretionary accruals as the ﬁtted value from the regression of total accruals in model 2. The DA are the devi-
ations of actual accruals from NDA:DA ¼ TANDA: ð4Þ4.3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
In the Chinese capital market, there are three types of ﬁrms: state-owned ﬁrms (SOEs), family ﬁrms, and
ﬁrms controlled by towns and villages (Xia, 2008). Comparatively, the shareholders of SOEs ﬁnd it easier to
get loans from banks (Tsai, 2004). Share pledge announcements are made mostly by non-SOE ﬁrms. Further,
because SOE ﬁrms have diﬀerent agency problems and more government interference, their earnings manage-
ment behavior could be inﬂuenced by the government. Therefore, we decide to test our hypothesis using non-
SOE ﬁrms. Because listed companies are required to disclose their ultimate controller, it is easy to determine
whether a ﬁrm is ultimately controlled by the state. We start with an initial sample of 3272 ﬁrm year obser-
vations (Table 1). Then we remove ﬁrms with missing data in calculating DA, leaving 2632 ﬁrm year obser-
vations (Table 2).
In this paper, we focus on the share pledge announcements made between 2004 and 2011 because there were
very few share pledge announcements before 2004.We also want to observe the eﬀect of the split share reform in1
ution of share pledging ﬁrms between 2004 and 2011.
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hemical industry 301 97 11731.77
ry of rubber and plastic products 47 18 2361.34
al equipment manufacturing 504 195 15182.01
aceutical industry 296 111 6650.73
manufacturing industries 704 209 23576.09
ry of gas and electric power 23 4 142.19
uction industry 62 17 1411.10
ort, storage and postal service industry 36 14 804.69
ry of information transmission, software and information
nology service
258 126 7796.69
industry 188 61 3723.91
state industry 189 117 30334.51
service industries 73 16 1105.10
nd publishing industry 9 7 219.50
iﬁed industries 205 92 8670.28
3272 1601 131875.04
Table 2
Descriptive statistics (2004–2011).
N Mean Std. dev Minimum Median Maximum
Year-dummy DA (one year lag) 2632 0.019 0.163 0.934 0.017 0.955
Kothari model DA (one year lag) 2633 0.018 0.167 0.971 0.018 1.059
Year-dummy DA 2629 0.017 0.163 0.934 0.016 0.959
Kothari model DA 2631 0.015 0.163 0.971 0.013 1.059
Pledge-YN 2687 0.160 0.367 0.000 0.000 1
Pledge-AM (million) 431 107.8 271.7 2.500 48.24 3820
Pledge-Rate 431 0.749 0.572 0.026 0.651 4.047
Block 2685 33.26 14.25 4.440 29.81 89.41
lnðAi;t1Þ 2685 21.07 1.187 11.35 21.04 24.81
LEV i;t1 2685 0.885 4.749 0.000 0.512 138.4
Growth 2685 0.386 6.331 10.45 0.060 246.7
StdCFO 2687 0.429 1.901 0.005 0.149 29.95
Year-dummy DA is calculated by models (3) and (4), the Kothari model DA is calculated by models (2) and (4), and Pledge_YN is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the company’s shares have been pledged, and 0 otherwise. Pledge_AM represents the number of shares
that have been pledged (by million Yuan). Pledge-Rate represents the percentage of pledged shares to the total shares owned by the largest
shareholder. Ln(Ai,t1) is the log of total assets in year t  1. Levi,t1 is the debt ratio in year t  1. Growth is the sales increase rate equal
to (SalestSalest1)/Salest1. StdCFO is the standard deviation of operational net cash ﬂow between 2004 and 2011.
Z. Huang, Q. Xue / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 137–152 1452006. By the end of 2006, 95% of China’s publicly listed companies had participated in the split share structure
reform (Li and Zhang, 2011). Therefore, we partition our sample into two periods: 2004–2006 and 2007–2011.
Before the reform, there were relatively fewer share pledges (Panel A of Table 1) because the shares held by large
shareholders were non-tradable and subject to stricter regulations. However, after the split share reform, the
non-tradable shares became tradable, and the number of pledged shares increased dramatically.
The pledge data are available in the WIND database. Other accounting and ﬁnancial data of the listed com-
panies are obtained from the CCER database.
Panel B of Table 1 provides the distribution of our sample by industry. Companies in the manufacturing
sector account for the largest number of pledged shares, followed by the real estate industry and machinery
industry. Apparently, pledging is actively conducted in some of the capital-intensive industries probably
due to their limited sources of funds.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample ﬁrm-year observations.
Firms that pledged shares constitute 16 percent of our sample (the mean of Pledge-YN). On average, large
shareholders pledged 74.9% of their shares in one year. The level of DA calculated using the Kothari model
has a lower mean than year-dummy DA. Table 2 displays the mean and median values of the control
variables.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Share pledges and earnings smoothing
Table 3 provides the results of the multivariate regression analysis of the eﬀect of share pledges on earnings
smoothing. Columns (1) and (2) are the results for the full sample. Two models are presented, each with one
proxy for share pledges: the binary variable (Pledge_YN). Both models are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
adjusted R2 values are 0.45 or higher. The coeﬃcient of DPDI is 0.422 with a p-value of <0.01, indicating
that earnings smoothing is common in non-SOE ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient on Pledge_YN  DPDI is 0.176 with
a p-value of <0.01, suggesting that share pledging ﬁrms smooth earnings more than the others.
Table 3 shows the results for the two periods: before 2006 and after 2007. In both periods, the coeﬃcients of
DPDI are signiﬁcantly negative. However, before the split share reform, the coeﬃcient of Pledge_YN  DPDI
is positive, which suggests that pledged ﬁrms do not conduct more earnings smoothing than other ﬁrms before
the split share reform. This ﬁnding contrasts with that after the split share reform, in which pledged ﬁrms have
a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient of Pledge_YN  DPDI. During 2007–2011, the coeﬃcient on Pled-
ge_YN  DPDI is 0.361 with a p-value of <0.01, which indicates that the share pledges motivated ﬁrms
Table 3
The test of incoming smoothing.
Using the absolute value of year-dummy model DDA and the Kothari model DDA as dependent variables with the pledged sample
DDAit ¼ d0 þ d1DPDIit þ d2Pledge YNi;t  DPDIit þ ni;t
Total sample 2004–2006 2007–2011
Year-dummy model
DDA
Kothari model DDA Year-dummy model
DDA
Kothari model DDA Year-dummy model
DDA
Kothari model DDA
DPDI 0.422*** 0.449*** 0.277*** 0.322*** 0.524*** 0.565***
(43.37) (47.55) (16.06) (20.20) (45.84) (51.73)
Pledge_YN  DPDI 0.176*** 0.178*** 0.093* 0.097** 0.361*** 0.371***
(6.091) (6.468) 1.787 2.007 (11.19) (12.05)
Constant 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.063 0.001
(0.744) (0.839) (0.022) 0.303 1.004 (0.218)
N 2586 2588 661 661 1924 1926
Adj. R-SQ 0.459 0.524 0.317 0.394 0.608 0.659
F-stat. 366.43 1424.3 52.24 215.92 498.31 1865.4
DA is calculated by models (2), (3), and (4). PDI is pre-discretionary income, which is calculated as net income minus discretionary accruals (PDI = E-DA). E is deﬂated by the
beginning-of-year total assets. Pledge YN is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company’s shares have been pledged, and 0 otherwise.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 4
The eﬀect of ownership structure on income smoothing.
Using the absolute value of year-dummy model DDA and the Kothari model DDA as dependent variables with the pledged sample
DDAit ¼ d0 þ d1DPDIit þ d2Blocki;t  DPDIit þ ni;t
Pledging sample 2004–2006 Pledging sample 2007–2011 Pledging sample
Year-dummy model DDA Kothari model DDA Year-dummy model DDA Kothari model DDA Year-dummy model DDA Kothari model DDA
DPDI 0.229*** 0.312*** 0.011 0.016 0.792*** 0.886***
(3.686) (5.306) (0.036) (0.053) (20.76) (27.93)
Block  DPDI 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.006 0.009 0.003*** 0.001
(6.096) (5.777) (0.531) (0.845) (2.800) (1.626)
Constant 0.017** 0.019*** 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.007**
(2.387) (2.848) (0.174) (0.466) (1.434) (2.166)
N 420 420 59 59 360 360
Adj. R-SQ 0.607 0.664 0.120 0.231 0.900 0.934
F-stat. 325.08 416.42 5.034 9.850 1615.4 2567.9
Where DA is calculated by models (2), (3), and (4). PDI is pre-discretionary income, which is calculated as net income minus discretionary accruals (PDI = E-DA). E is deﬂated by the
beginning-of-year total assets. Block is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 5
Ordinary least-squares regressions predicting one-year post-pledging returns with share pledge and controls.
Predicting one-year post-pledging returns with pledging level (sample: pledged ﬁrms and matched ﬁrms)
Independent variables Raw returns Market-adj. return
Pledge_Dummy 0.085* 0.095*
(1.654) (1.849)
Ln(Pledge-AM) 0.012** 0.012**
(2.076) (2.133)
Pledge frequency 0.137** 0.137**
(2.061) (1.738)
Ln(Sizet1) 0.055* 0.060* 0.054* 0.042 0.047 0.041
(1.739) (1.887) (1.719) (1.342) (1.493) (1.306)
Levt1 0.137 0.135 0.128 0.185 0.185 0.176
(0.939) (0.931) (0.878) (1.258) (1.262) (1.197)
BTMt-1 0.505
*** 0.514*** 0.491*** 0.026 0.034 0.009
(2.879) (2.931) (2.809) (0.148) (0.193) (0.049)
beta 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.498) (0.525) (0.569) (0.442) (0.457) (0.497)
Year Dummy Control
Constant 1.605** 1.695*** 1.578** 0.858 0.953 0.829
2.539 2.68 2.501 1.379 1.53 1.332
n 440 440 440 440 440 440
Adj. R2 0.288 0.291 0.29 0.018 0.02 0.02
The dependent variables are raw returns and market adjusted returns, calculated by the following models (a) and (b). We apply three
measures of pledge (Pledge-Dummy, which equals one for pledged ﬁrms and zero for the matched sample; Ln (Pledge-AM) is the natural
logarithm of the amount of shares being pledged; and pledge frequency is the number of share pledge announcements made within one
year). Ln(Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVt1 is the debt ratio in year t  1. BTM is calculated by the book value per share
deﬂated by the closing price one week before pledge. Beta is based on the regression of the individual share weekly risk premium (50–
100 weeks before pledge) on the equity weighted market risk premium (CAPM model).
Annual raw returns ¼Q49t¼1ð1þ RitÞ  1 (a)
Annual market adjusted returns ¼Q49t¼1ð1þ RitÞ 
Q49
t¼1ð1þ RmtÞ (b)
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
148 Z. Huang, Q. Xue / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 137–152to smooth their earnings. Therefore, we conclude that the eﬀect of share pledges on earnings smoothing is pri-
marily driven by the sample after the split share reform. Our ﬁndings imply that when large shareholders have
a strong motivation to manage earnings, the ownership structure facilitates them to do so.5.2. Additional analysis: Ownership concentration and earnings smoothing
Although we have found evidence supporting our hypothesis that share pledging ﬁrms are more likely to
smooth earnings, we still do not know whether the ownership structure played any role. Therefore, we use
the share pledging ﬁrms as a sample, and test the eﬀect of ownership concentration on earnings smoothing.
The results are presented in Table 4. The results for the total pledging sample show that the estimated coef-
ﬁcient of DPDI is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with Table 3 that
share pledging ﬁrms smooth earnings. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on Block  DPDI is 0.01 with a p-value of
<0.01, which suggests that the greater the share ownership, the more the shareholders smooth earnings. As
shown in Table 3, we only ﬁnd signiﬁcant results during the 2007–2011 period with the year-dummy DA
model. This suggests that large shareholders have a similar ability to smooth earnings before and after the split
share reform. However, their ﬁnancial reporting behavior is associated with their motivation to pledge.5.3. Additional analysis: Share pledges and market return
We predict that when ﬁrms make share pledge announcements, they manage earnings to inﬂuence the share
price. However, if the stock market can observe this earnings management, the share prices will not increase,
Table 6
Sensitivity test of incoming smoothing.
Using the absolute value of year-dummy model DDA and the Kothari model DDA as dependent variables
DDAit ¼ d0 þ d1DPDIit þ d2Pledge YNi;tðPledge AMi;tÞ  DPDIit þ X 0i;tBþ ni;t
Total sample 2004–2006 2007–2011
Year-dummy model DDA Kothari model DDA Year-dummy model DDA Kothari model DDA Year-dummy
model DDA
Kothari model DDA
DPDI 0.405*** 0.645*** 0.447*** 0.461*** 0.277*** 0.541*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.524*** 0.542*** 0.569*** 0.586***
(41.19) (70.83) (47.30) (49.24) (16.06) (28.91) (19.12) (19.25) (45.84) (47.99) (52.49) (54.73)
Pledge_YN  DPDI 0.176*** 0.184*** 0.093* 0.073 0.361*** 0.359***
(6.091) (6.628) (1.787) (1.452) (11.19) (11.74)
Ln(Pledge-AM)  DPDI 0.007*** 0.046** 0.007 0.048* 0.212*** 0.213***
(2.890) (2.517) (1.488) (1.677) (8.601) (9.138)
Size_1 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.006** 0.007***
(0.891) (0.437) (1.549) (1.588) (0.013) (0.699) (0.854) (0.861) (1.279) (1.448) (2.361) (2.604)
Lev_1 0.011* 0.000 0.009 0.011* 0.016 0.000 0.015 0.015 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033***
(1.747) (0.364) (1.564) (1.812) (1.087) (0.123) (1.056) (1.070) (5.170) (5.296) (5.432) (5.536)
Growth 0.020** 0.000 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.031 0.000 0.039** 0.038** 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.001
(2.337) (0.144) (3.505) (3.131) (1.634) (0.651) (2.157) (2.064) (0.860) (0.921) (0.118) (0.070)
StdCFO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.340) (0.149) (0.445) (0.473) (1.592) (0.637) (1.502) (1.514) (0.721) (0.756) (0.485) (0.519)
Constant 0.050 0.015 0.084 0.086 0.004 0.099 0.151 0.152 0.063 0.073 0.117** 0.131**
(0.744) (0.329) (1.359) (1.385) (0.022) (0.798) (0.897) (0.904) (1.004) (1.147) (2.019) (2.235)
N 2586 2586 2588 2588 661 936 661 661 1924 1924 1926 1926
Adj. R-SQ 0.459 0.673 0.526 0.519 0.317 0.544 0.398 0.399 0.608 0.598 0.666 0.657
F-stat. 366.43 1111.8 479.89 66.86 52.24 186.62 73.91 74.10 498.31 477.77 641.45 616.11
Where DA is calculated by models (2), (3), and (4). PDI is pre-discretionary income, which is calculated as net income minus discretionary accruals (PDI = E-DA). E is deﬂated by the
beginning-of-year total assets. Pledge YN is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company’s shares have been pledged, and 0 otherwise. Pledge AM represents the number of shares
being pledged. lnðAt1Þ is the log of total assets in year t  1. LEVt1 is the debt ratio in year t  1. Growth is the sales increase equal to (SalestSalest1)/Salest1.MPB is the market to
book ratio calculated by the average annual price divided by EPS in year t  1. StdCFO is the standard deviation of operational net cash ﬂow between 2004 and 2011.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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150 Z. Huang, Q. Xue / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 137–152and ﬁrms will have no reason to keep manipulating earnings. Teoh et al. (1998a) point out that IPO issuers
report unusually high earnings before an IPO, and buyers are guided by such earnings and pay a high price for
the shares. Therefore, we need to examine the market reaction and long-term return of share pledging ﬁrms to
conﬁrm our postulation.
We run an ordinary least squares regression of one-year post-pledging returns with the pledge indicators
(see Teoh et al., 1998b), using the sample between 2009 and 2011. We compare the share pledging ﬁrms with
the matched sample. The results in Table 5 reveal that pledging ﬁrms have better returns, and that the higher
the value of the shares pledged, and the more frequent the share pledge, the better the returns. Following Teoh
et al. (1998b), we use both raw returns and market adjusted returns for the test. Both measures of returns show
similar results.5.4. Robustness tests
We conduct two sensitivity tests. First, we use a continuous variable (Pledge-AM) to measure share pledges.
Pledge-AM is the amount that shareholders pledge, in billion RMB. In Table 6, the coeﬃcient on Pledge-AM
is 0.046, which suggests that the share pledge level is positively related to smoothing. We also include control
variables in our main test model. A number of factors that are important determinants of DA have been iden-
tiﬁed in the earnings management literature. Research generally shows that total assets, leverage, growth, and
operational cash ﬂow may aﬀect the magnitude of earnings management. The regression results are similar to
our previous tests.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we re-examine the relationship between ownership structure and discretionary ﬁnancial
reporting. The literature provides two diﬀerent views on this relationship. Entrenchment theory holds that
ownership concentration is associated with lower earnings quality. In contrast, alignment theory posits that
controlling shareholders may provide higher quality reports. We investigate ﬁrms whose shares are pledged
by their shareholders. Speciﬁcally, we test whether these share pledging ﬁrms smooth their earnings more than
other ﬁrms and how their behavior changes with the incentives triggered by the split share reform. Before the
split share reform, shareholders held large amounts of non-tradable shares. Pledging shares for loans was the
only way to transfer their shareholdings. The share pledges were not based on the share price, but the book
value of the ﬁrm. Thus, the ﬁrms had no incentive to smooth earnings.
After the split share reform, large shareholders could choose to sell their shareholdings or pledge their
shareholdings for loans. The share price became the primary factor in deciding the amount of a loan. To facil-
itate loan ﬁnancing and avoid violation of debt covenants and maintenance calls, shareholders wish to see an
increase in the share price. Therefore, we predict that the market performance of share pledging ﬁrms is better
than the others. If the share price drops after a share pledge, the large shareholder will do whatever it can to
uphold the share price. Managing annual earnings is unlikely to serve as a timely measure. For example, com-
panies may repurchase, release other good news, or manipulate quarterly earnings. However, accounting earn-
ings represent the fundamental proﬁtability of a ﬁrm, and annual earnings announcements aﬀect share prices.
Therefore, ﬁrms may need to strategically report their annual earnings. Firms pledge repeatedly, and thus we
predict that share pledging ﬁrms smooth their earnings more than other ﬁrms.
We use Chinese non-SOE ﬁrms in our analysis because non-government controlling shareholders have
more diﬃculty obtaining loans in the Chinese banking system. Comparing SOE and non-SOE ﬁrms, we ﬁnd
that non-SOE ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of pledging than SOE ﬁrms. Another reason we
exclude SOE ﬁrms from our sample is that SOE ﬁrms sometimes conduct special tasks for political reasons
or according to macroeconomic policy.
Our results support our hypothesis. Using Tucker and Zarowin’s (2006) model, we ﬁnd that the
relationship between the change in the DA proxy and change in pre-discretionary income is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative for share pledging ﬁrms. Furthermore, this eﬀect does not exist before the split share reform, but
becomes signiﬁcant after the reform is implemented. With the 2009–2011 sample, we also ﬁnd a marginally
Z. Huang, Q. Xue / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 137–152 151positive correlation between share pledges and market returns, indicating that share pledging ﬁrms have better
market performance.
The ﬁndings presented in this paper contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we provide more
direct evidence on the eﬀect of ownership concentration on ﬁnancial reporting. Second, our results imply that
share pledges can trigger earnings management, which should serve as a reminder for investors and regulators.
Like most studies, our paper is not without its limitations. It is diﬃcult to measure earnings smoothing, and
most of the existing models could not be used in our setting. Although we use a model with and without con-
trol variables, we admit that our measures may not fully capture the dynamics of earnings smoothing. Finally,
we acknowledge that share pledging is a very special setting that can only be found in a few countries.
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